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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, the leading national representatives of the
American legal profession, the American Bar Association (ABA), and
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), issued a joint
report (the Report) on the nature of lawyers' professional responsibility in the context of the adversary system.' Principally authored
by legal philosopher Lon Fuller,2 who co-chaired the joint conference
that issued it, the Report's premise was that the legal profession's
inherited traditions provided only indirect guidance to lawyers in
light of their changing roles, and that a "true sense of professional
responsibility" must derive from an understanding of the "special
services" that the legal profession "renders to society and the
services it might render if its full capacities were realized."3 A
decade later, the Report was quoted throughout the footnotes to
the Preamble and Ethical Considerations of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility,4 suggesting that the Report captured
or influenced understandings that continued at least through the
early 1970s.
The Report was short on examples and long on abstraction. It
included only one story of an exemplary lawyer.5 That story came
not from domestic law practice but from abroad-from "the life of
Thomas Talfourd," an early nineteenth-century English barrister,
judge, author, and member of Parliament:'
1. AM. BAR ASS'N & ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF
THE JOINT CONFERENCE, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) (hereinafter REPORT).
2. David Luban, RediscoveringFuller'sLegal Ethics, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS
ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 193,199 (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der
Burg eds., 1999).
3. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1159-60.
4. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. preliminary statement, nn.3-5 &
7 (1980); id. at EC 2-1 n.4, 2-15 n.25, 2-25 n.40, 2-27 n.45, 2-30 n.51, 7-1 n.5, 7-3 n.9, 7-8 nn.18
& 19, 7-13 n.24, 7-17 n.29, 7-19 nn.32 & 33, 7-20 n.36, 8-1 nn.2 & 3,8-2 n.4. Work on the ABA
Model Code commenced in 1964 with the appointment of a committee to propose amendments
to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, and culminated in 1969 with the adoption of
the ABA Model Code by the ABA House of Delegates. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN

LEGAL ETHICS 56 (1986).
5. The story was included in the beginning of the Report's discussion of "Private Practice
as a Form of Public Service." REPORT, supra note 1, at 1162.
6. Id.

2009]

"PUBLIC SERVICE MUST BEGIN AT HOME"

1209

As a barrister Talfourd had successfully represented a father in
a suit over the custody of a child. Judgment for Talfourd's client
was based on his superior legal right, though the court recognized in the case at bar that the mother had a stronger moral
claim to custody than the father. Having thus encountered in the
course of his practice an injustice in the law as then applied by
the courts, Talfourd later as a member of parliament secured the
enactment of a statute that would make impossible a repetition
of the result his own advocacy had helped bring about.7
The Report used Talfourd's story to illustrate the "sense in which
the lawyer must keep his obligations of public service distinct from
the involvements of his private practice."8
The Report's account of Greenhillv. Greenhill,9 the 1836 case that
Talfourd argued, is too abbreviated to capture the extent of the
injustice he helped achieve. ° In 1835, six years after her marriage,
and while caring for three infant daughters, Mrs. Greenhill learned
that her husband, whom she believed to be off yachting, had in
fact been living for more than a year with another woman whom
he passed off as his wife." When Mrs. Greenhill brought divorce
proceedings, Mr. Greenhill retaliated by demanding that she relinquish the children. 2 Custody proceedings followed. 3 Despite Mr.
Greenhill's refusal to end his adulterous relationship and despite
Mrs. Greenhill's undeniable fitness as a parent, Mr. Greenhill had
the superior legal right under precedents that regarded children as
the husband's chattel. 4 Mr. Greenhill demanded that the children
7. Id.
8. Id. ('This line of separation is aptly illustrated by an incident in the life of Thomas
Talfourd.").
9. (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (KB.).
10. Caroline Norton, an early nineteenth-century poet, novelist, and political activist, gave
a fuller account of the Greenhill case in a political tract written under the pseudonym Pearce
Stevenson in support of what was to become the Custody of Infants Act of 1839. CAROLINE
NORTON, A PLAIN LETTER TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE INFANT CUSTODY BILL 34-35
(1839). Norton was motivated by a similar personal experience. See generallyJAMES 0. HOGE
& JANE MARCUS, INTRODUCTION TO CAROLINE NORTON, SELECTED WRITINGS OF CAROLINE
NORTON, at vii-xvii (James 0. Hoge & Jane Marcus eds., 1978); Martha J. Bailey, England's
First Custody of Infants Act, 20 QUEEN'S L.J. 391 (1994-95).
11. NORTON, supranote 10, at 60.
12. Id. at 61.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 62-63, 68.
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be delivered to his mother, with whom he had formerly been
estranged and who had until then refused to see her grandchildren. 5 Further, he sought to prevent his wife from seeing the
children, as was his legal right.1 6 When Mrs. Greenhill refused to
comply with a court order to deliver up the children, her husband
sought her imprisonment for contempt of court. 17 Mrs. Greenhill
offered to live anywhere and to make any arrangement for Mr.
Greenhill to visit the children, but Mr. Greenhill, spurred on by his
mother, refused even at the judge's urging to reach an accommodation.' 8 This was the matter in which Talfourd successfully advocated
the husband's custody claim."9 As a contemporary put it: Talfourd
"had been compelled to support that as an advocate, which as a
man, possessed of the same generous sympathies as his fellow men,
he must have felt to be iniquitous and absurd."2
From our own perspective, the Report's choice of this particular
story among all the possibilities was unfortunate in five respects.2 '
First, Talfourd's story seems to portray the lawyer's self-conscious
civic engagement as work performed entirely outside the ordinary,
everyday private practice of law.22 In this account, only outside
private practice did Talfourd dedicate his knowledge and skills
explicitly to public ends. Elsewhere, the Report expresses the presumption that zealous advocacy properly provided on behalf of
private clients promotes the public good. 23 But, Talfourd's example
seems to test that presumption, given the iniquitous result.
Second, the story implicitly portrays civic engagement-in
Talfourd's case, endeavoring to improve the law as a member of
15. Id. at 63.
16. Id. at 64-66.
17. Id. at 65.
18. Id. at 66.
19. Id. at 61-69, 71-72.
20. Id. at 71-72.
21. The Report's use of this story was previously criticized in James F. Smurl, In the
PublicInterest: The Precedentsand Standards of a Lawyer's PublicResponsibility, 11 IND. L.
REv. 797, 811-18 (1978); see also Comment, The Lawyer's Moral Paradox,1979 DuKE L.J.

1335, 1353 n.64.
22. For an analysis of the reverse situation-in which public officials are faced with the
dilemma of advocacy undermining their past and future clients' interests-see generally
James E. Moliterno, A Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The Client CenteredDisadvantagefor
Lawyers Acting as Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261 (2009).
23. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1160-61.

2009]

"PUBLIC SERVICE MUST BEGIN AT HOME"

1211

Parliament-as a pastime for the professional elite. Third, and
again implicitly, the story portrays civic engagement as a concept
from a distant place and time that presumably needs to be planted
or resurrected on American soil. Fourth, the story of Talfourd's
success as an advocate in achieving an immoral result for a private
client is entirely silent about a lawyer's role in counseling the client,
including regarding moral and other nonlegal considerations such
as, in this case, the children's best interests and the husband's
moral obligations to his wife.24 Finally, the story is equally silent
about the possibility of refusing to engage in a representation that
is morally repugnant.25
Talfourd's work to reform the child custody law exemplifies a
conception of the "citizen-lawyer" that has prevailed since our
country's founding.2 6 This is the idea of the lawyer as patriotic
leader outside the everyday professional work of representing
clients.2" Our Essay explores an alternative conception of the
citizen-lawyer, also rooted in earlier American law practice but
less explicitly identified, and also given expression in the 1958

24. Presumably, as a barrister Talfourd could not perform the counseling function. But,
as Norton recounted the story, Mr. Greenhill also had a solicitor who abetted the client's
efforts to remove three infant children from their innocent mother, and who presumably could
have performed a counseling function. NORTON, supra note 10, at 61.
25. Under the traditional "cab rank" rule, English barristers do not have discretion to
decide who to represent. See William C. McMahon III, DecliningProfessionalism in Court:A
ComparativeLook at the English Barrister,19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 851-52 (2006).
26. See, e.g., Davison M. Douglas, The Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education,51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 185, 187-88, 193-95, 211 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing
Class:The FormationandDissolutionof the Original Understandingof the American Lawyer's
Role, 8 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 381, 381-83 (2001). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Some
Thoughts About Citizen Lawyers, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1153 (2009) (exploring the many
meanings of a "citizen lawyer"); Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal
History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169 (2009) (analyzing
competing views among lawyers as to the proper scope of their public or civic obligations as
lawyers).
27. For example, in 1915, Indiana Supreme Court Judge Orrin N. Carter included in his
legal ethics book a section on 'The Lawyer as a Citizen" in which he wrote: "Possibly the
greatest service that has ever been performed for the public in this country has been rendered
by lawyers as citizens, and not in their professional capacity or as public officials." ORRIN N.
CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 36-37 (1915). He pointed to the writings of
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay in the Federalist Papers leading to the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, and gave as an example in his own day the work of "lawyers who outside of their
professional duties have served as leaders in helping to settle the great social, industrial and
political problems of the day." Id.
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ABA/AALS Report.2" That is the idea that a lawyer's civic obligation
is expressed in the manner in which the lawyer conducts everyday
private practice and includes an obligation to convey to clients the
lawyer's understanding of proper civic conduct. We call this the idea
of the lawyer as "civics teacher." In recent years, this conception has
largely dropped out of the legal profession's conversation about
lawyers' obligations to serve the public.29 Rather, the organized bar
emphasizes the American lawyer's civic role as expressed in law
reform, pro bono work, and other efforts outside daily private
practice."° Our aim is not to take issue with this effort, the importance of which we do not dispute, but rather to suggest that the
lawyer's civic role has an additional dimension.3
The conception of the lawyer as civics teacher directly addresses
the lawyer's role as client counselor in the daily private practice of
law, regardless of whether the matter relates to a transaction or to
litigation. It emphasizes that when lawyers counsel clients about
their legal rights and obligations, and about how to act within the
framework of the law, lawyers invariably teach clients not only
about the law and legal institutions, but also, for better or worse,
about rights and obligations in a civil society that may not be
established by enforceable law-including ideas about fair dealing,
respect for others, and, generally, concern for the public good. This
28. REPORT, supra note 1.
29. Many commentators have argued for a more robust role for the lawyer in counseling
clients. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 157-61 (2007); THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994);
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 50-52 (1998);
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1988); Deborah L.
Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1317-20 (2006). The organized bar's
efforts to promote lawyers' professional commitment to the public good, however, have largely
focused on law reform and pro bono work. See, e.g., Martha W. Barnett, Angels of Justice, 86
A.B.A. J. 10 (2000); Robert E. Hirshon, To the Heroes Among Us, 87 A.BA. J. 10 (2001);
Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 1, 6 (1995);
Howard Lesnick, Why Pro Bono in Law Schools, 13 LAw & INEQ. 25, 25-29 (1994); see also
Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6-20 (2004); Howard M.
Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2108-11, 2115-16 (2004); Pearce,
supra note 26, at 417-20.
30. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 10; Hirshon, supra note 29, at 10; see also Cummings,
supra note 29, at 18; Pearce, supra note 26, at 419-20.
31. See generally W. Taylor Reveley III, The Citizen Lawyer, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1309
(2009) (arguing that lawyers have an unusually strong need to be civic minded and to work
for the public interest); Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM.& MARY L. REV. 1323
(2009) (examining the "special responsibilities" of lawyers as "public citizens").
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conception also addresses aspects of lawyers' work aside from client
counseling, because lawyers teach clients by example, especially
when lawyers address their own legal obligations in the course of a
representation. Adopting and elaborating upon the idea of the
lawyer's role as civics teacher, we suggest, would lead lawyers to
perform this function more self-consciously and, therefore, more
often for the better.
This Essay begins in Part I by sketching the concept of the lawyer
as civics teacher. Part II offers two reasons why lawyers should
make a self-conscious effort to teach civics well and shows how this
conception is rooted in Fuller's Report as well as in writings that
both predate and postdate it. Finally, Part III places the conception
in the context of contemporary professional and academic discussion
of four subjects: the lawyer's duty to serve the public, the lawyer's
role in a democracy, the lawyer's counseling function, and the
lawyer's dealings with professional colleagues.
I. THE IDEA OF THE LAWYER AS CIVICS TEACHER
In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,32 Justice
Brandeis wrote that: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example."33 Justice Brandeis was responding to the Court's decision
to authorize the government's use of evidence secured through
wiretapping.34 His point was that the government teaches by
example whether or not it means to do so, and that in this case,
its example of indifference to the law would encourage public
lawlessness.3 5 Almost seventy years later, the Court described this
statement, in which "Justice Brandeis recognized the importance of
teaching by example," as "pathmarking. 3 6
Borrowing Justice Brandeis's phrase, we would describe lawyers
also as potent and omnipresent teachers, particularly on the subject
of civic norms and values.3 7 In part, our claim is descriptive. In
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 466 (majority opinion).
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
In general, we would adopt Charles N. Quigley's idea of a civics education as including
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society, lawyers in fact teach their fellow citizens how to understand
their rights and responsibilities as members of a community-their
obligations to obey the law, aspirations to fulfill the spirit of the law,
and responsibilities to the good of their neighbors and the general
public.3 8 Lawyers teach civics both directly in the course of counseling clients and indirectly by example. 9 They do so through what
they say and do, and through their silence and inaction, whether or
not they are self-conscious about the role, and, if they are selfconscious, whether they consider this function to be central or
the knowledge and skills and inculcation of the values necessary for "informed, responsible
participation in political life by citizens committed to the fundamental values and principles
of American constitutional democracy." Charles N. Quigley, Education for Democracy,
BLUEPRINT, Apr. 1, 1999, http://www.ndol.orgtndoLci.cfm?kaid=115&subid=145&contentid
=1450 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009); see also Sanford Levinson, What Should Citizens (as
Participantsin a Republican Form of Government) Know About the Constitution?,50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1239, 1247-48 (2009) (discussing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's advocacy for
civics learning in grade school education). See generally Mark Tushnet, Citizen as Lawyer,
Lawyer as Citizen, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1379 (2009) (comparing how ordinary citizens
interpret the Constitution with how lawyers do). Quigley identifies basic democratic "values
and principles" to include basic "individual rights and responsibilities, concern for the public
good, the rule of law, justice, equality, diversity, truth, patriotism, federalism, and the
separation of powers." Quigley, supra. Further, he identifies "civic dispositions"-including
"responsible self-governance by each individual, moral responsibility, self-discipline, and
respect for individual worth and human dignity"-"that contribute to the healthy functioning
of the political system and the improvement of society." Id. He also identifies "traits of public
and private character"-including "public spiritedness, civility, respect for law, critical
mindedness, and a willingness to negotiate and compromise"-that are indispensable for our
democracy's vitality. Id. Needless to say, we do not claim that lawyers can, do, or should
address all possible elements of a good civics education in every representation. The extent
and nature of the dialogue with the client will depend upon the context.
38. When we use the term citizen, we do not mean only those in a community who are
citizens as defined in immigration and naturalization laws. Rather, we are employing the
term more broadly to include all people who live in a particular community, a nation being
only one way to define the bounds of a (usually) large community. A nation, in turn, is itself
made up of smaller communities of various sizes and locations. Accordingly, the role and
responsibilities of membership in these communities is rather complex, as is the role of lawyer
as civics teacher.
39. See Stephen Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 403 (2000).
The best way to teach ... is through example. Every time we represent a client,
argue in court, participate in a public or professional meeting, or take on pro
bono work, we set an example. With every action-and inaction-we send a
message to our peers and, more importantly, to the next generation. That
message can say that standards matter, that law matters, that civic life matters,
that participation matters. The lawyer's role as teacher is his most important
role in public service, for it encompasses all the others.
Id. at 416. See generally Pearce, supra note 26.

2009]

"PUBLIC SERVICE MUST BEGIN AT HOME"

1215

incidental to their work.4" Like the government, lawyers teach for
good or for ill and whether or not they intend to do so.
A few examples will help illustrate this idea.
When lawyers counsel clients about how to act within the law,
especially when the meaning of the law is unclear, they explicitly
or implicitly teach their clients about civic obligations both under
the law and beyond the law. Advising the client to stay comfortably
within the law4 (or to comply with the imperfectly expressed spirit
or purpose of the law) teaches one conception of civic obligation.42
Encouraging the client to exploit legal loopholes or to test legal
limits teaches a different conception.43 Similar lessons are taught
by example. When litigators decide how to comply with uncertain
discovery and procedural obligations 4 4-whether to implement the
spirit of the law or to exploit the law's inexactitude-they teach by
example, conveying to clients how the lawyer regards her own civic
responsibility in addressing legal boundaries.
When transactional lawyers advise clients about what to disclose
to those with whom their clients are doing business, independently
of legal disclosure obligations, lawyers convey their understandings
about mutual obligation among those who engage in commerce
40. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 416.
41. Particular questions of interest are raised when the client regards the law to be
morally unjust. Counseling compliance with the law reflects one view of citizens' obligations.
See, e.g., GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 17 (1920) (arguing that "law ...
is
practically nothing more than the embodied conscience of the political community" to its
"paramount assertion of control and direction each individual of the community is bound to
submit" as "a moral duty" (emphasis omitted)). Advising about the legitimacy (or illegitimacy)
of civil disobedience reflects another view of citizens' obligations. See generally Thomas D.
Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representationin a PluralisticSociety, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 984, 1028 (1995) (defending the provision of legal advice about civil disobedience when
the client has a "compelling and well-grounded" moral claim).
42. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 27, at 51 ("Consistently with his oath of office and duty
to his profession, the lawyer cannot do anything else than advise his client to obey the law in
letter and in spirit.").
43. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Dec.
2004, at 113, 115, availableat http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200412/simon ("Many lawyers
insist that they have a duty to exploit loopholes in the interests of their clients whenever
possible.... [Enron's law firm] has responded to criticism by saying that as long as what the
client wanted could be accomplished within the law, the law firm was not responsible for any
bad consequences.").
44. For one of many discussions of lawyers' approaches to discovery and of discovery
abuse, see Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
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within the civic community. Lawyers teach similar lessons by
example when clients observe the lawyer's own negotiations and the
extent to which the lawyer is candid or unforthcoming.
When a lawyer concludes that the client has only a weak legal
claim or defense in litigation, the lawyer's advice (or lack of advice)
about whether to proceed in litigation teaches a lesson. The client
has a legal right to exploit the proceedings if the claim or defense is
not frivolous, and doing so may enable the client to pressure the
opposing party to settle on favorable terms.4" Whether the lawyer
encourages this, admonishes that this is not a proper use of the
courts or not a proper attitude toward legal rights and obligations,
or, indeed, refuses to represent the client in court, teaches the client
not only about legal rights but also about the role of the courts and
attitudes toward the law and legal institutions. Of course, additional counseling considerations apply where a case raises issues of
systemic or distributive justice, such as when a party seeks law
reform to promote a broader view of justice, where significant
imbalances in power exist between the power of the parties, or
where a party's fundamental needs (such as food or shelter) are at
stake.46
Similar lessons are taught when a lawyer counsels a client
whose claim or defense, although legally sound, is inequitable. Two
examples are traditionally given. In the first, a debtor client with
the financial ability to pay a just debt must decide whether to repay
the debt or invoke the statute of limitations to bar the creditor
from recovering.47 In the second, a client who agreed orally to convey
property and received money for it, but then received a better offer,
might decide whether to convey the property or attempt to defeat a
claim for transfer of the property by arguing that a writing was
necessary to establish a binding agreement.4 8 Whether the lawyer
advises the first client to pay the debt or advises the second client

45. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy J.,
concurring) ("For [patent licensing] firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions
arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.").
46. Cf. William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to
Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 991, 996-1000 (1999).
47. See GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHicAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 187 (1910).
48. See id. at 187-88.
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to convey the property, as a matter of civic obligation,4 9 or instead
accepts the representation and invokes the legal defense, teaches
the client, for better or worse, about how to regard legally unenforceable agreements made to others in the community. Here, too,
questions of systemic or distributive justice may also complicate the
counseling challenge.5"
Although our focus is on everyday private practice, we note also
that lawyers unavoidably teach civics by example outside their
professional work. 5 ' When lawyers serve on juries, they make an
implicit public statement about the significance of this civic
obligation. When they seek to avoid jury service, claiming that they
lack the time or suggesting that they know too much to be fair, they
teach the opposite lesson, whether or not intentionally.5 2
As these examples suggest, we offer an image of the citizenlawyer that is just the opposite of Thomas Talfourd-a member of
the nineteenth-century British professional elite who advocated for
immoral results in private practice and sought to improve the law
in his later years in public life. 3 The lawyer as civics teacher is an
ordinary, contemporary American lawyer whose sense of civic
obligation influences his or her daily private practice, and most
especially his or her approach to counseling clients.
This means that the lawyer does not rest on the claim that
ordinary legal practice plays a significant role in civic life for
reasons that are intrinsic to law practice-for example, as may be
true, that lawyers promote a just society whenever they advocate for
clients within the bounds of the law and that they promote the rule
of law whenever they advise clients about the law's limits. The civic
49. This is one early traditional view of how the lawyer should advise clients in these
examples. See id. at 185-88; CARTER, supra note 27, at 51-52 (recounting Lincoln's refusal to
take a legally sound but unjust case against a widowed mother with six children). Archer
regards the duty to give this advice as a duty that lawyers owe to the state. ARCHER, supra
note 47, at 185-87.
50. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
51. See generally Friedman, supra note 26.
52. Likewise, lawyers teach by example when they bring or defend legal proceedings on
their own behalf, such as when they engage in what appear to be misuses of the judicial
system. See, e.g., Nice Try: Cleaner Wins $54 Million Pants Lawsuit, ALASKA BAR RAG, Oct.Dec. 2007, at 23 (describing administrative law judge's unsuccessful two-year lawsuit seeking
$67 million, later reduced to $54 million, in damages from a dry cleaner that allegedly lost his
pants).
53. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1162; see supra text accompanying notes 6-8.

1218

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1207

teaching role we envision involves a more robust idea of "civics" and
a more self-conscious idea of teaching. At a minimum, this includes
educating clients about civic obligations that are not legally enforceable and that may be found in the "spirit" of the law.54 Further,
and perhaps even less precisely, our concept includes counseling
clients about general concepts (equality, respect for others, fairness,
civility) that are not captured by either the law's letter or spirit, but
that reflect ideas of civic obligation that influence people's voluntary
conduct as an ordinary matter and that may therefore bear on the
client's or lawyer's conduct in a legal representation.
Three additional observations: First, we would not limit the
lawyer-client conversation about the public good to situations where
the clients' proposed conduct is patently antisocial. Lawyers assist
clients in making fully informed decisions. This requires consideration of all relevant considerations, not just legal considerations. 5
Considerations of civic obligation are relevant even when it is far
from clear which way they point or when they point in conflicting
directions.
Second, and relatedly, civic obligations can mean different things
to different lawyers and at different moments in history. The
nineteenth-century legal elite had a notion of civic obligation that
was typically aligned with that of their clients, that gave primacy
to property interests, and that was inconsistent in many ways
with contemporary notions.56 Lawyers today may have ideas of civic
obligation that are far less closely aligned with their clients' civic
intuitions. Thus, we do not suggest that lawyers' civic teachings
must have any prescribed content, other than that the "hired gun"
54. The idea of the law's "spirit" is itself ambiguous. One might understand its relevance
to be simply as an aid to understanding the meaning of the law, as might be true of the law's
"purpose." But our understanding of the concept is as a source of potential self-restraint
beyond that which the law would be interpreted to impose. See generallyW. Bradley Wendel,
Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1473 (2006);
Symposium, The InternalPoint of View in Law and Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2006).
55. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950) ('The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only what is
permissible but also what is desirable.... His duty to society as well as to his client involves
many relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considerations."); see also
Pritchard v. County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Judge Wyzanski and
observing that "[wihat Judge Wyzanski observed long ago applies with equal force today").
56. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Originsof the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 254 (1992) (describing George Sharswood's view).
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approach, focusing exclusively on compliance with the "letter of the
law," reflects too narrow a view. Generally speaking, as Deborah
Rhode has previously observed, the lawyer's role requires counseling
about and consideration for "the letter of the law, and
... core
57
principles of honesty, fairness, and social responsibility.,
Finally, it follows from this that our emphasis is on opening up a
lawyer-client conversation about civic obligation and the public
good. We are not proposing that lawyers demand that the client act
in any particular way or that lawyers generally decline or terminate a representation when the client's lawful conduct strikes the
lawyer as antisocial, although there may be situations that warrant
doing so." Some nineteenth-century writers took that stronger view
of lawyers' obligation to integrate civic considerations into their
practice, insisting that certain objectives, although lawful, should
not be furthered, and certain means, although lawful, should not be
employed. 9 Some commentators today take a similar view. ° We do
not do so, in part because we think that discerning obligations of
citizenship, beyond maintaining a commitment to compliance with
the law, is complicated, and in part because we believe that good
"teaching" means having a mutually respectful conversation in
which the teacher does not compel adherence to her views.
II. WHY LAWYERS SHOULD TEACH CIVICS WELL
Besides making a descriptive claim, we make a prescriptive claim:
that lawyers should consider their role as civics teachers to be
central to their work and should strive to teach it well. We offer two
arguments.6 ' The first, which echoes Brandeis's observation in
57. Rhode, supra note 29, at 1319. Rhode's article argues "that lawyers have a moral
responsibility to provide moral counseling, whether or not it can be packaged in pragmatic
terms." Id. We conceive of the relevant principles as aspects ofpolitical morality and that they
can be cast in terms of civic obligation, rather than exclusively in terms of personal morality,
on the one hand, or client self-interest, on the other.
58. Cf. Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?,45 STAN. L. REv. 1759, 1769-70
(1993) (stressing the importance of such deliberation to "constitutional democracy").
59. E.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752, 754 (Arno Press 1972) (vols.
1 & 2 1836).
60. E.g., LUBAN, supra note 29, at 62-64.
61. Neither of these arguments requires a belief that lawyers have a superior ability to
perceive the public good, although they are certainly consistent with such a belief. For a
historical examination of lawyer perspectives grounded in the superior connection of lawyers
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Olmstead, might be summed up as follows: "As long as lawyers are
unavoidably teaching ethics, they ought to try to do a good job of it,
if only out of a sense of public obligation."62 The second, which
derives from the ABA/AALS Report and from other writings before
and since, reflects an affirmative understanding of the lawyer's
responsibilities.6"
A. Teaching Civics Well as a Public Service
Lawyers should teach civics self-consciously and for the better
because lawyers are potent and invariable teachers of the subject,
the subject is important, and teaching it well is a public service that
lawyers can provide with no special effort.
To begin with, the need for civics education is plain.' In a
collection of writings on the "citizen lawyer," it is most appropriate
to cite no less a source than Thomas Jefferson, who wrote: "I know
of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them but to inform their discretion."65 To put it more
prosaically, people need to understand their rights, responsibilities,
and roles in a civil society. The effective functioning of our society
presupposes that they do. Each new generation must be taught.6 6
to the public good, see Pearce, supra note 26. In the sociological literature, "structural
functional" theorists, such as Durkheim and Parsons, made a similar claim. See, e.g., RICHARD
L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 14-16, 34-35 (1989).

62. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
63. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1160-62.
64. Indeed, as was pointed out in this symposium, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
argued that civics teaching, if anything, is on a rapid decline in primary education. See
Levinson, supra note 37, at 1242-43.
65. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820). Seegenerally
Douglas, supra note 26, at 192-95; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. As Justice Breyer has observed:
[The Supreme Court is] there to keep the system on the rails....
The democratic
rails, the boundaries, the creation of the democratic space within which people
are to make their own decisions. That is what Tocqueville said in 1830. How is
it possible, he asks, that in this society where the basic idea is everyone has
something to offer and (unlike Europe) there is not some social class that is "us
and not them"-why does this country not go off the rails?... And he answered
the question by saying, "because people practice democracy." They learn how.
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It is also well-acknowledged that schools do not always do the job
successfully and thoroughly,6 7 and people have too few other
effective opportunities to learn. People can learn indirectly through
observation of others,' but those whom they observe may not be
adequate role models or, in observing, people may infer the wrong
lessons.
A legal representation, on the other hand, is an obvious context in which to teach civics to clients and to the community.
Understandings about how to regard the law and how to interact
with legal institutions and fellow citizens are implicitly or explicitly
implicated in virtually all representations. 9 We have noted that
clients can learn indirectly by observing their lawyers," or they can
learn directly in the civics tutorial that we ordinarily call client
counseling.7 " But beyond that, clients can "learn by doing," which is
one of the most effective ways to learn. 2 That is the case when the
legal representation calls on the client to give effect to, or to ignore,
his understanding of his own civic obligations.7" Neither form of
education is limited to clients alone. Friends, family, coworkers,
employees, employers, adversaries, community members-all who
They learn how in town meetings, or they learn how in school, to work with
others. They learn that you have to cooperate. They learn that you better listen
to what somebody else says if you want your way. They learn that we are part
of something bigger than us and that when we make decisions we are deciding
as a group.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a JuniorJustice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 13 (2005).
Tocqueville, of course, emphasized the importance of lawyers as instrumental to how the
people learned to practice democracy. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
264-70 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row, Perennial Library ed. 1986)
(1966); cf. Pearce, supra note 26, at 392.
67. See Levinson, supranote 37, at 1242-43; Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education:Recent
History, CurrentStatus, and the Future,62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (1999).
68. Cf. Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality from Others' Conduct, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 1429 (2006).
69. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950);
REPORT, supra note 1, at 1159-60 (describing the varied roles of a lawyer and accompanying
responsibilities to society); Gutmann, supra note 58, at 1768.
70. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Breyer, supra note 39, at 416;
Green, supra note 68, at 1431-32.
71. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; see also United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at
359; ARCHER, supra note 47, at 185-87.
72. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 13 (describing how people learn civic responsibility in
daily life); Quigley, supra note 67, at 1426, 1430 (listing effective means of civics instruction).
73. See, e.g., ARCHER, supra note 47, at 185-87; HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 764.
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learn of the matter through word of mouth or the press and all
whose lives are affected directly and indirectly-will receive a lesson
in civic responsibility.7 4
One can argue that the government, in licensing lawyers, might
fairly demand that lawyers shoulder this responsibility.75 Or one
might argue, as we do below in Section B, that promoting clients'
sound understandings of civic responsibility is intrinsic to the
lawyer's role, properly understood. But those are separate claims.
Our point here is simply that, if teaching civics by word and deed is
unavoidable, lawyers' commitment to the public good compels the
conclusion that lawyers should take this function seriously and
strive to teach well. 76 Lawyers who teach civics well serve an
important public function, while those who teach poorly undermine
the public interest in having civically disposed and informed
citizens.7 7

74. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 1160; Green, supra note 68, at 1431-32.
75. Gleason Archer, almost a century ago, took the view that because the state (through
the courts) grants lawyers "new standing in the community" and "new powers and privileges,"
it may properly "exact greater accountability from [the lawyer] than from the ordinary
citizen." ARCHER, supra note 47, at 183; see also CARTER, supra note 27, at 37 ("The lawyer
is entrusted with interests and powers of great magnitude. It is of vital importance that his
sense of duty should be in proportion to the magnitude of these interests."); JOHN R. DOS
PASSOs, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: As HE WAS-As HE IS-As HE CAN BE 127 (1907) ("In every
employment which the lawyer receives, his primary duty is to the State ...
[b]ecause he is a
part of the judicial system of the Government."); HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL
IDEALS OF THE LAWYER 23 (1925) ("A lawyer is a citizen with enhanced responsibilities. The
dignity of his office constrains him to serious observance of civic obligations ...[which
includes] avoid[ing] even the appearance of disrespect to or disregard of constitutional or
statutory regulations."). However, the contemporary understanding is that practicing law is
not an exercise of state power, lawyers are not "officers of the court" in either a literal or
political sense, and there are therefore limits on what burdens can be placed on lawyers as
a condition of being licensed to practice law. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,
282-83, 288 (1985).
76. Cf. ARCHER, supra note 47, at 183 (stating that lawyers have additional "duties and
obligations" demanding "greater accountability" than from ordinary citizens).
77. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 416 (describing the importance of the lawyer's role as
teacher); Quigley, supra note 67, at 1433-34 (noting the effects on the public of poor civics
education); see also REPORT, supra note 1, at 1162 (explaining when lawyers serve or hinder
the public interest).
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B. Teaching Civics Well as Intrinsic to the Lawyer's Social
Function
Fuller's Report does not refer to lawyers as "civics teachers.""8 But
it does describe the lawyer's role in a manner that, notwithstanding
the Talfourd story, gives significant weight to the lawyer's duty to
serve the public in ordinary private practice and that, in particular,
takes note of the lawyer's pedagogic role in doing so. 79 The
ABAIAALS Report's conception had antecedents in earlier writings
on the legal profession and it was carried over into subsequent
writings.'s
1. The ABA /AALS Report's Idea of Lawyers'PedagogicRole as
Derived from Their Social Function
To begin with, Fuller's Report takes the view that a lawyer's
"work must find its direction within a larger frame" than simply
"the faithful discharge of duties assigned to him by others."" That
larger framework is provided by an understanding of the lawyer's
societal role. 2 The Report recognizes that "[p]rivate practice is a
form of public service when it is conducted with appreciation of, and
a respect for, the larger framework of government of which it forms
voluntary forms of
a part, including under the term government ...
self-regulation. '' 3
That lawyers in private practice serve a quasi-governmental
function is a pervasive concept in the Report, which refers to the
lawyer's position as an "office,"' suggesting that the lawyer serves
as more, or other, than simply an agent of private clients. 8' This
conception is set forth explicitly by the Report's pronouncement that
"[t]he lawyer's highest loyalty" is not to the client "but to procedures

78. See REPORT, supra note 1.
79. See id. at 1161-62.
80. See infra Section II.B.2.
81. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1159.
82. See id.
itself
83. Id. at 1162 (further stating that "[p]rivate legal practice, properlypursued,is ...
a public service') (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1159.
85. See id. at 1159, 1162, 1216.
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and institutions" 6-an implicit repudiation of the "hired gun"
conception that is often attributed to Henry Lord Brougham.17 The
Report describes the lawyer as a trustee "for the integrity of those
fundamental processes of government and self-government upon
which the successful functioning of our society depends,"88 and observes that "democratic and constitutional government is tragically
dependent on voluntary ... co-operation in the maintenance of its
fundamental processes and forms."8 9 The Report sketches out the
significance of this conception of the private practitioner's role in the
context of three functions that lawyers perform: advocacy, negotiating and drafting, and counseling.9"
Not surprisingly, the Report envisions adjudication as serving a
crucial governmental function: the impartial resolution of disputes.9 1
It describes adjudication within an adversary setting in particular
as crucial to just resolutions.92 Without adversary presentations, the
judge would be required to serve not only as neutral arbiter but as
both parties' representatives, going back and forth between a
sympathetic identification with the parties and a neutral role, with
the likelihood of judging prematurely.9" "Partisan advocacy," which
relieves the judge of these multiple roles, thus "plays a vital and
essential role in one of the most fundamental procedures of a
democratic society.... The institution of advocacy is ... an expression
of human insight in the design of a social framework within which
man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization."'94 Partisan advocacy, however, does not invariably serve the
86. Id. at 1162.
87. See generally Pearce, supra note 56, at 394-95, 405, 409 (describing how Brougham's
American contemporaries expressly rejected his perspective and how his view became the
"standard conception" following the 1960s) (quoting Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1978)); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce
A. Green, ReconceptualizingAdvocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2005) (observing
that Brougham's 1820 declaration "that 'an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but
one person in all the world, and that person is his client' ... remains emblematic of a
conception that is arguably the 'dominant' one among United States lawyers" (quoting 2 TRIAL
OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, Albion Press 1821))).
88. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1162.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1160-62.
91. See id. at 1160-61.
92. See id. at 1160.
93. See id. at 1160-61.
94. Id. at 1161.
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prescribed social function.9 5 Partisanship must be restricted in
accordance with these general principles.9 6 On one hand, "[t]he
advocate plays his role well when zeal for his client's cause promotes
a wise and informed decision of the case.... Thus, partisan advocacy
is a form of public service so long as it aids the process of adjudication."97 On the other hand, partisan advocacy ceases to serve the
public "when it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and
obfuscates, when it renders the task of the deciding tribunal not
easier, but more difficult."9"
Although the lawyer's role in negotiating and drafting takes place
outside the setting of government institutions and processes, the
Report situates that role in the context of voluntary self-governance,
which it regards as playing an equally important role in a democracy. 99 It notes that most "human relations are set" in our society
"by the voluntary action of the affected parties," who "collaborate
and ...
arrange their relations" by, for example, "forming corporations [and] partnerships," contracting and leasing, and transacting
in other large and small ways "by which their rights and duties
toward one another are defined."'' 0 "[S]uccessful ...
collaboration"
requires "a framework for the parties' future dealings," comparable
to a formal charter, and in our society, the lawyer is "the natural
architect of this framework."1 °1 In this role, the lawyer "advances
the public interest when he facilitates the processes of voluntary
self-government" but "works against the public interest when he
obstructs the channels of collaborative effort, when he seeks petty
advantages to the detriment of the larger processes in which he
participates."'0 2 As in advocacy, the lawyer's duty is not solely to the
client: "[T]he good lawyer does not serve merely as a legal conduit
for his client's desires, but as a wise counselor, experienced in the
art of devising arrangements that will put in workable order the
entangled affairs and interests of human beings."'0 3
95. See id.
96. Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1161-62.
Id. at 1162.
See id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
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Finally, as counselor, the lawyer "contributes to the administration of the law" and "effective realization of the law's aims" by
advising clients about the outcome of potential litigation and about
compliance with the law. 104 The Report observes that by reminding
clients of the 'long-run costs" of proposed conduct, "the lawyer often
deters his client from a course of conduct technically permissible
under existing law, though inconsistent with its underlying spirit
and purpose."' 5 And it cautions that "[tlhe reasons that justify and
even require partisan advocacy ... do not grant any license to the
lawyer to participate as legal advisor in a line of conduct that is
immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality.""°
The Report envisions the lawyer's responsibility to promote
107
governance and self-governance as including a pedagogic role.
For example, it observes that the lawyer has a duty to preserve
voluntary cooperation "by imparting the understanding necessary
to give it direction and effectiveness".-"a duty that attaches [both]
to his private practice [and] to his relations with the public.' 0 8
Further, the lawyer "has an affirmative duty to help shape the
growth and development of public attitudes toward fair procedures
and due process;" otherwise, "there is an inevitable tendency for
practice to drift downward to the level of those ... whose experience
of life has not taught them the vital importance of preserving just
and proper forms of procedure." °9
How does Talfourd's story fit into this vision of private practice
as a form of public service where the lawyer practices consistently
with a proper understanding of the lawyer's role in society?" 0 Not
comfortably. The Report speculates that "Talfourd's devotion to
public service" as a member of Parliament "grew out of his own
enlightened view of his role as advocate.""' Furthermore:
It is impossible to imagine a lawyer who was narrow, crafty,
quibbling or ungenerous in his private practice having the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162-63.
Id. at 1216.
See id. at 1162.
Id.
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conception of public responsibility displayed by Talfourd. A sure
sense of the broader obligations of the legal profession must
have its roots in the lawyer's own practice. His public service
must begin at home."'
As to Talfourd, however, that is pure conjecture. One might imagine
the story differently: that his law reform efforts were a self-imposed
penance for working to help a vindictive, adulterous husband deny
a fit mother visitation rights to three infant children who scarcely
recognized him." 3
Regardless of how one views the story of Thomas Talfourd, the
Report expresses a conception of the citizen-lawyer that has been
largely overwhelmed by two other ideas. One is the popular
conception of the zealous advocate that has leached into virtually
all aspects of law practice." 4 The other is the idea that public
service takes place largely outside the private practice of law on
behalf of ordinary clients: through public office, law reform activities, pro bono representation, and the "representation of unpopular
causes."

115

2. Antecedents to the ABA/AALS Report's Idea of Lawyers'
PedagogicRole
The Report's conception that lawyers in ordinary law practice
should serve the public good in part by teaching clients about
cooperative relationships and fair dealings has its roots in earlier
understandings." 6 Both David Hoffman and George Sharswood, two
112. Id.
113. See supra Introduction.
114. See Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About CorporateLawyers After Reading The Cigarette
Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor"GivenWay to the "HiredGun"?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407,41833 (2001) (discussing how "the philosophical movement within the practicing bar has been for
the adversary ethic to spill over from adjudicative proceedings into corporate representation
that occurs outside the adjudicatory context"); Thomas L. Shaffer, Business Lawyers, Baseball
Players,and the Hebrew Prophets,42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2008) (observing that "[o]ur
[contemporary] obsession [with the adversary ethic] has obscured the distinction between"
litigators and business lawyers).
115. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1216-17; see Barnett, supra note 29, at 10; Hirshon, supra
note 29, at 10; Katzmann, supra note 29, at 25.
116. See Pearce, supranote 56, at 241,243 (describing historical influences on modem legal
ethics).
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of the first major American legal ethicists,117 saw the everyday work
of lawyers instructing clients as vital to the proper functioning of
society." 8 They believed that without lawyers' guidance people
would undermine "order, liberty, and property" as they sought to
"promote their interests at the expense of the rights and interests
of others.""' 9 The function of lawyers was to persuade clients to
understand and respect the rule of law and the public good. 2 ° In
contrast to their self-interested clients, lawyers possessed a greater
virtue that enabled them to identify and pursue the public good.' 2 '
This virtue enabled lawyers both to "gain the confidence of" clients
and to persuade them of '"sound principles"' that went beyond the
letter of the law.' 22 As Sharswood noted, "[a] very important part of
the advocate's duty is to moderate the passions of the party, and,
where the case is of a character to justify it, to encourage an amicable compromise of the controversy."'2 3 Counsel to a client should
consider not only what was legal but what was just.'24 Clients
should not pursue the letter of the law at the expense of its spirit.'25
Sharswood advised, "confine not yourself in your transactions with
your fellow-men to giving them simply the strict measure of their
legal rights, give them all that is honestly theirs as far as you have
ability, whether the law affords them a remedy or not. 12 6
Both Hoffman and Sharswood took a strong view of lawyers' civic
obligations. Although differing between themselves, both took the
view that the lawyer's civic obligation in private representations
went beyond the lawyer's counseling function. 2 7 Each called on the
lawyer to refrain in some cases either from engaging in lawful but
117. See id. at 241, 249 (describing Sharswood's ethics essay as being the source of current
ethics codes, and citing Hoffman as being part of the nineteenth-century legal ethics debates).
118. See id. at 256; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 754, 764.
119. Pearce, supra note 56, at 254.
120. See id. at 256.
121. See id. at 255-56.
122. See id. at 256 (quoting George Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics, 32 A.B.A.
REP. 1, 30 (1907)).
123. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 109 (T. & J.W. Johnson &
Co., 5th ed. 1896).
124. See id. at 113-14; Pearce, supranote 56, at 258.
125. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at 113-14; Pearce, supra note 56, at 258, 269.
126. SHARSWOOD,supra note 123, at 114; see also Pearce, supra note 56, at 266.
127. Compare HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 750-51, with SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at
109, 113-14.
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antisocial conduct or from engaging in lawful conduct that would
serve antisocial ends.1 28 For example, each asserted that lawyers
1 29
should refuse to pursue an unjust claim on behalf of plaintiffs.
Hoffman urged lawyers not to use defenses that "ought not[ ] to be
sustained," such as "the Statute of Limitations, when based on
the mere efflux of time."'3 ° Sharswood was less categorical, maintaining that lawyers should not assist debtors of '"ample means"'
in harassing or taking advantage of a creditor.1"3 ' In defense of a
criminal defendant accused of an egregious crime such as a
parricide, Hoffman said a lawyer should not provide '"special
exertions,"' only the efforts needed to '"secur[e] to them a fair and
dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due
application of the law.""3 2
As corporate legal practice developed in the late nineteenth
century, Louis Brandeis extended this perspective to the corporate
lawyer.'33 In an essay that is more famous today for its discussion
of the lawyer's responsibility in the area of law reform, Brandeis
observed that representing corporations implicated the wisdom and
skill required for "diplomacy" and "statesmanship."'" 4 With "training
... [that] leads to the development of judgment,"'35 lawyers had
achieved the societal "position of the adviser of men." "' In the
business arena, 'lawyers are needed, not only because of the legal
questions involved, but because [ofi the particular mental attributes
and attainments which the legal profession develops."' 37 Applying
good judgment to the representation of businesses was a form of
public service. 3 ' Brandeis observed that:

128. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 754; SHARSWOOD, supranote 123, at 109, 113-14.
129. HOFFMAN, supranote 59, at 754; SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at 113-14.
130. HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 754.
131. SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at 113-14; Pearce, supra note 56, at 266 n.199 (quoting
SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at 113).
132. Pearce, supra note 56, at 265 n.193 (quoting HOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 755-56). In
contrast, Sharswood asserted that all criminal defendants were entitled to a zealous defense.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 123, at 90-92, 105.
133. LOUIS BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 320-21 (1914).
134. Id. at 319.
135. Id. at 315.
136. Id. at 317.
137. Id. at 319.
138. Id.
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The relations between rival railroad systems are like the
relations between neighboring kingdoms. The relations of the
great trusts to the consumers or to their employees is like that
of feudal lords to commoners or dependents. The relations of
public-service corporations to the people raise questions not
unlike those presented by the monopolies of old.'39

A well-known incident from Brandeis's own practice offers an
example of how the civics teacher role requires lawyers to think
beyond the material self-interest of the client and to advise the
client on the implications of its actions on others. Representing
United Shoe against its employees' who complained that their
employment should be annual rather than seasonal, 40 Brandeis
"determined that these claims were legitimate and worked with his
client to revamp the plants' manufacturing schedule in a manner
Brandeis believed to be in the best interest of both his client and the
employees."' 4 '
In 1908, when the ABA promulgated its first code of ethics, it
wholeheartedly embraced the notion that the civic responsibility of
lawyers was fundamental to their work. According to the Preamble
to the Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons'), 'The future of the
republic, to a great extent, depends upon [lawyers'] maintenance of
justice pure and unsullied."'4 2 To fulfill this obligation, lawyers must
139. Id. at 319-20.
140. John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 755; David Luban, The
Noblesse Oblige Traditionin the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717, 722-23 (1988); Pearce,
supra note 26, at 401-02.
141. Pearce, supra note 26, at 402. In 1978, Geoffrey Hazard employed Brandeis's notion
of "the lawyer for the situation" to incorporate these considerations into some representations.
Hazard sought to do this by relaxing the conflict of interest rules to permit lawyers to
represent clients with differing interests who were seeking to work together amicably.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS INTHE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978). His efforts led to the
short-lived Model Rule 2.2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 2.2 (2003) (marking the
end of the rule's short life); HAZARD, supra, at 58-68; Dzienkowski, supra note 140, at 744
n. 11. The view of lawyer as civics teacher takes a different approach. Representing multiple
clients is not necessary to permit the lawyer to incorporate consideration of the good of all
parties into a negotiation. Cf. Luban, supra note 140, at 722-23 (recommending a similar
approach). Rather, the lawyer can always advise the client to pursue an alternative that
promotes harmony with its counterpart. After all, a good citizen considers how her actions will
impact her neighbors and society. Whether or not the client takes this advice, the lawyer
offers a model of good citizenship.
142. MODEL CANONS OF ETHICS pmbl. (1908), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/1908-
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reject the "false claim ... that it is the duty of the lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's
cause." 4 ' While providing "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights,"'44
civic responsibility required the lawyer to "advis[e]" the client to
avoid pursuing "questionable transactions, ... bringing questionable
suits, [and undertaking] questionable defenses.... "" According to
the Canons, in the
"'Last Analysis[,] ... despite the contrary urging of any 'client,
corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil
or political, however important .... ' [t]he lawyer 'will find his
highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and
trust and to public
" 1 46
loyal citizen.
3. The Perpetuationof the ABA/AALS Report's Idea of Lawyers'
PedagogicRole
The Report's conception of civic responsibility continued in
professional discourse through the 1970s. In the early 1960s, according to Erwin Smigel, Wall Street lawyers described their role as
a "buffer between the illegitimate desires of... clients and the social
interest.' 1 47 Lawyers representing corporations would "serve ... as
the conscience of big business.' 1 48 They urged their clients to
consider not only the letter of the law but its spirit and the good of
the community, based "upon not only what is permissible but also
what is desirable.' 4 9 Smigel found that big firm "[1]awyers often use
their positions as advisors to guide their clients into what they
believe to be proper and moral legal positions,"'5 ° applying this view
both to litigation and to transactional work.''
code.pdf [hereinafter ABA CANONS]; see Pearce, supra note 26, at 400.
143. ABA CANONS, Canon 15.
144. Id.
145. Id. Canon 31.
146. Pearce, supra note 56, at 268 (quoting ABA CANONS, Canon 32).
147. ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, WALL STREET LAWYER 342 (Ind. Univ. Press 1969) (1964).
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 5-6.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 6-8. Stewart Macauley painted a similar picture in his study of consumer
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As previously noted, the 1970 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility cited repeatedly to Fuller's Report. 5 2 Among other
things, it expressed the understanding that "[1]awyers, as guardians
of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, [such as
through the maintenance of] the rule of law grounded in respect for
the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for
enlightened self-government.' 53 Similarly, the 1983 Model Rules
of Professional Conduct described the lawyer as a "public citizen
having a special responsibility for the quality of justice"'5 4 and
permitted the lawyer to counsel clients on civic responsibility under
a rule authorizing the lawyer to refer to "moral, economic, social and
political factors."'5 5 But in general, after the 1960s, professional
discourse about lawyers' civic role, their contributions to governance
even as private practitioners, and their obligation to temper their
own advocacy and to counsel clients in light of a broader sense of
social responsibility was filtered out of the professional discourse.
By 1985, for example, most elite lawyers no longer claimed that the
public good played a major role in their everyday practice.'5 6
In the past year, a consortium of corporate law firms issued a
statement of "shared values" that illustrates how far the corporate
bar's ideology now departs from Fuller's conception.'5 7 The statement posits that as a matter of principle a lawyer must "vindicate
the values of the client-up to the limits of the law," without regard
for countervailing "values currently important to the general public"
or to "the amorphous concept of 'common good."" 58 Indeed, the
protection litigation in Wisconsin in the 1970s. Stewart Macauley, Lawyers and Consumer
ProtectionLaws, 14 LAW & SOC'YREV. 115, 117, 127-28 (1979) (suggesting that the "hired gun"
model does not accurately characterize professional practice, as lawyers often "seek to
educate, persuade and coerce both sides to adopt the best available compromise," and
describing this role in consumer protection cases in particular).
152. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
153. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).
155. Id. R. 2.1.
156. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice,and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Value and
Client Relationships in the Large Firms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503, 533 (1985) (describing survey
indicating that lawyers in large firms rarely give advice regarding the public interest); Pearce,
supra note 26, at 407-10 (and articles cited therein).
157. LEX MUNDI, LEX MUNDI AND PROFESSIONALISM: A STATEMENT OF SHARED
FUNDAMENTALVALUES (2008), availableat http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/
Publications/SharedFundamentalValues.pdf.
158. Id. at 5.
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statement advises that lawyers must embrace their clients' values
and perceived interests with what it calls '"principled enthusiasm,"'
as "[c]lients pay their lawyers not just for results, but for attitude as
' Although noting that lawyers should be "publicly engaged
well."159
and committed participants in the political and social processes,"
the statement conceives of this function of '"engaged' citizenship,"
like that of pro bono services, as extrinsic from the representation
of private clients."'°

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT IN PROFESSIONAL AND
ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
The concept of lawyers as civics teachers in everyday law practice
offers a different way of thinking about at least four important
subjects: the lawyer's commitment to the public good; the lawyer's
role in a contemporary democracy; the lawyer's counseling function;
and lawyers' relationships with each other.
A. Serving the Public Good
First, the civics teacher concept offers a view of the lawyer's role
that is somewhat different from that found in the conventional
conversation regarding the lawyer's commitment to the public
good. As a general matter, the contemporary conversation does not
focus on lawyers' everyday practice. 6 ' The conversation ordinarily
concerns the duties of lawyers to provide pro bono assistance,' 62 to
defend civil rights and civil liberties, 63 and, as in the story of
Thomas Talfourd,' 6 to promote law reform.16 5 To the extent that the
conversation about serving the public good touches on everyday
159. Id. at 8. As Deborah Rhode has observed, however, the idea that out of respect for
client autonomy, lawyers should not interpose values not expressed by clients themselves
assumes that both the client and the lawyer accurately perceive the client's values. This may
not be the case, especially before the lawyer counsels the client with regard to relevant
nonlegal considerations, and it may never be true in the case of a corporate client. Rhode,
supra note 29, at 1330.
160. LEX MUNDI, supra note 157, at 6, 8.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 39, at 405-09.
163. See id. at 411-13.
164. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 39, at 409-11.
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practice, it has sought to set boundaries that would prevent lawyers
from assisting in client wrongdoing 6 or has identified
lawyers as
167
role models in exemplifying obedience to law.
As civics teachers, lawyers have a far broader responsibility
for incorporating an understanding of the public good into their
practice. Doing so is quotidian, not exceptional. In almost every
aspect of practice, whether providing advice, negotiating with an
adversary, appearing in court, or in other capacities, lawyers affect
how clients and, in many cases, third parties, conceive of their
rights and responsibilities. In this work, lawyers have great discretion. They may choose to teach that the only guide to appropriate
conduct is maximizing individual conduct within the bounds of the
enforceable law-that one's civic responsibility is only to oneself and
to respect the law only as a boundary on self-interest. On the other
hand, lawyers may choose to teach that appropriate conduct
requires taking into account not only one's self-interest but also
one's obligations to one's fellows and one's community. Lawyers
primarily teach these lessons through their conversations with
clients, but they 16
also
teach them when they interact with others on
8
behalf.
client's
a
B. The Lawyer's Role in a Democracy
Second, the concept adds to the broader discussion of the lawyer's
role in a democracy. Although this discussion was historically
prominent in the United States, 169 today it takes place largely with
respect to transitional and developing democracies, where our own
bar ascribes to lawyers an important role in promoting and
sustaining democratic legal and institutional reform, largely
through work outside the everyday representation of private clients.
This ascribed democratic role may also include educating the public
about its legal rights and how to assert them as well as educating
the public about legal obligations and restrictions. 170 The idea of the
166. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(d) (2008).
167. On the latter point, see Breyer, supra note 39, at 416.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 26.
170. See, e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A
Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 611-14, 617-19 (2000); H.
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American lawyer as civics teacher underscores that promoting and
sustaining a democracy is not just a job for foreign lawyers and
invites us to engage in exchanges with professional colleagues in
developing democracies about our comparative roles and challenges.
C. The Lawyer's CounselingFunction
The concept also offers a different way of discussing the lawyer's
counseling function. The ABA acknowledges the legitimacy of
discussing nonlegal considerations with clients, including relevant
'
"moral, economic, social and political factors,"1 71
and many have
argued for the importance of providing "wise counsel," rather than
more narrow, technical, and exclusive focus on explaining the
meaning and application of the law.'7 2 But many lawyers feel
uncomfortable counseling clients with respect to moral, as distinct
from business, considerations out of skepticism about the legitimacy
of their own values or out of concern that their values are not
shared by the client.' The idea of the lawyer as civics teacher
suggests a particular class of nonlegal considerations to which the
lawyer might refer-namely, those relating to the expectations and
obligations of citizenry.'7 4 In their particulars, civic values may not
be universally shared. Nonetheless, ideas of civic obligation and
Kwasi Prempeh, Lawyers and LiberalDemocracy, J. DEMOCRACY 71 (2000).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008). Thus, if not ethically compelled,
noncoercive discussions of civic considerations are certainly ethically permissible. See
generally Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in ProfessionalDecisionmaking, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 19, 41-48 (1987) (discussing permissibility of moral counseling).
172. Thomas Shaffer recently gave two excellent examples from his early years in private
practice. In the first, the partner (on Shaffer's advice) counseled an insurance company client
that although it would be lawful to refuse to pay a young widower's claim on his wife's life
insurance policy because it was filed outside the thirty days required by the policy, doing so
would be morally wrong, and the company accepted the advice. Shaffer, supra note 114, at
1070-71. In the second, a partner advised a company in the early 1960s that, although a
recent executive order did not require the company to integrate its mills, there was no doubt
that it ought to do so. Id. at 1072-75.
173. See Green, supra note 171, at 41-48.
174. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalismand Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1303, 1359-60 (1995). In an earlier volume of this law review, Fred Zacharias reached
a similar conclusion about lawyers' counseling role, but one that he ascribed to lawyers' duty
to maintain objectivity. Among other things, he suggested that lawyers' moral dialogue with
clients should focus on client conduct injurious to third parties, client conduct meant to avoid
legal obligations, the fairness of the disposition, and in general, "any obligations to third
parties or societal interests that the lawyers believe should be honored." Id.
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virtue should be regarded as legitimate subjects of discussion and,
at the general level, as shared values, in a way that other beliefs
175
and ideas may not be.
Although some lawyers are reluctant to discuss these concerns,
clients may welcome such guidance. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., General
Electric's former senior vice president and general counsel, has
explained how he sought in outside counsel both "an outstanding
technical lawyer" and "a wise counselor," who could offer "thoughtful
insights into all the nonlegal issues-ethical, reputational, and
commercial.' ' 1 76 Heineman similarly understood his own role as
general counsel as including "establishing global values and
standards beyond what financial and legal rules require; shaping
the company's ... role as a corporate citizen[,] and ... addressing
questions of how to balance the company's private interests with the
public interests affected by the corporation's actions.' 7 7
Discussions about civics may ultimately point clients in the same
direction as discussions of morality or other nonlegal considerations,
but the discussion will sound different and may resonate with the
client in a different way. 17 Both lawyer and client may find it easier
to engage in conversation regarding civic responsibility, and both
may perceive that lawyers have a stronger claim of expertise when

175. Consider the following two examples. First, suppose that federal law prohibits U.S.
companies from selling products to certain rogue countries, but for First Amendment reasons,
the law excepts sales of publications. If a corporation asks for legal advice regarding whether
the law allows it to sell publications that contain technical information and that are designed
for commercial purposes, the lawyer may conclude that the publications are excepted from the
embargo. But the lawyer might go on to advise that the material is within the spirit of the
law's prohibition and encourage the client to consider whether, as a good U.S. corporate
citizen, the company would want to promote the law's purpose even though the material is not
technically covered.
Second, suppose that a publisher learns that someone has infringed its copyright, is
confident that the problem can easily be resolved with a phone call, but sees this as an
opportunity to file a lawsuit that will garner publicity and discourage other would-be
infringers. The publisher's lawyer might ask the publisher to consider whether, although it
has legal grounds to sue, it should refrain from doing so as a matter of good citizenship as this
would involve a misuse ofludicial resources and unfair and excessive use of legal force against
the infringing party.
176. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2007, at 81, 84.
177. Id. at 82.
178. As coauthors, we have different views regarding the propriety of deliberating with
clients on broader moral questions.
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it comes to civic considerations, such as the value of concern for the
"spirit" of the law.

D. The Lawyer's Relationship with ProfessionalColleagues
Finally, the idea that a lawyer should model good citizenship
within the context of client representation offers a different way of
thinking about relations among lawyers. Within the adversary
process, for example, lawyers are in relationships with their
counterparts, just as clients are in relationships with their own.
Lawyers might think of each other as "opposing counsel" or "adversaries," but they might also think of each other as professional
brethren. This is the conception suggested by the title of a recent
centennial history of the New York County Lawyers' Association.' 79
They might construct uncivil, even hostile relationships. Or they
might strive, to the extent possible, to create relationships of civility
and mutual trust within which they advocate for their clients
zealously and perhaps even more effectively than if they were socalled "hardball litigators."'"0
Thinking about professional relationships as an expression of
one's civic understandings provides a different way of thinking
about recurring subjects of professional conduct in the adversary
process. Among these are whether one comports with civility codes,
whether one extends professional courtesy, how one deals with inadvertent disclosures, whether lawyers make and adhere to handshake deals, whether one makes true but intentionally misleading
representations, whether one takes an aggressive approach to
discovery obligations and other legal and ethical obligations, and the
like. Further, the idea of the lawyer as civics teacher may provide
179. EDWIN DAVID ROBERTSON, BRETHREN AND SISTERS OF THE BAR (2008).

180. For discussions of civility and incivility in litigation practice, see, for example, Stewart
F. Hancock, Jr., Days of Conviviality Preceded Specializationand Globalization,73 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 35 (2001); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalismas Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy,28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994); Christopher J. Piazzola, Ethical Versus Procedural
Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1197 (2003); Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism:A Study of Judges' and
Lawyers'Accounts of Ethicsand Civility in Litigation,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998); Brenda
Smith, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the "Civil"War Over ProperAttorney Conduct
Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 DAYTON L. REV. 151 (1998); Adam Owen Glist, Note,
Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Movement, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 757
(2000).
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a different kind of rationale for resolving these kinds of questions.
The preference, where possible, for developing relationships of trust,
for treating others fairly, for complying with the spirit of the law,
and for negotiation and compromise may serve as a rationale for
improving professional relationships when calls for "professionalism" are not sufficiently compelling.'
CONCLUSION

At times, lawyers have been asked to serve as societal role
models, and particularly as "citizen-lawyers." One aspect of the
lawyer's role as citizen-lawyer might be characterized as that of a
civics teacher. This conception draws on concepts and discourse
going back to the American legal profession's earliest days but
finds especially full expression and justification in a Report
authored by Lon Fuller a half-century ago. We part company with
Fuller, however, in our rejection of Thomas Talfourd, a nineteenthcentury barrister who served in the English Parliament, as a
professional exemplar. In Talfourd's stead, we offer a vision of
everyday lawyers who incorporate public service by word and deed
into their everyday private law practices, including the manner in
which they counsel clients, interact with other lawyers, and regard
their own legal obligations. Teaching civics, we suggest, is an
unavoidable role for such lawyers. The only question is how well
they fulfill it.

181. See generally Bruce A. Green, Public Declarationsof Professionalism,52 S.C. L. REV.
729, 730-32 (2001) (suggesting reasons why lawyers are uncomfortable discussing
"professionalism").

